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Humanitarian Intervention and the United States
Once “humanitarian intervention” is spoken into existence, it is often met with a wide variety of
reactions. J.L. Holzgrefe explains it well: “it is a bit like crying ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre: it can
create a clear and present danger to everyone within earshot” (Holzgrefe 1). In a room full of
philosophers, policymakers, and political scientists, it may lead to doubt and skepticism. Often,
questions of whether a military intervention can be humanitarian, or simply how powerful
governments select who they help, arise. For the purpose of this analysis, I will utilize the
definition of intervention by Hozlgrefe. He defines humanitarian intervention as “the threat or
use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending
widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its
own citizens” (Holzgrefe 2). By this definition, the United States has on some occasions engaged
in humanitarian intervention and on the other occasions has chosen to refrain from such
intervention.
The United States is selective when it comes to helping other nations in moments of crisis.
With the largest funded military in the world and well-established peaceful intervention
programming, such as the Economic Support Fund, Development Assistance, Food Aid, and
Security Assistance (Guess 3), the United States is capable of assisting foreign nations. These
resources have allowed for complete and successful interventions, where a resolution comes to
fruition. But what drives the American decision-making to intervene in one area, while leaving
other struggling states untouched? For instance, Yemen is enduring the worst humanitarian
situation in the world, according to the United Nations. Although the United States had pledged
millions in humanitarian aid for Yemen during the winter of 2019, they continued to sell billions
in bombs and other weapons to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that brought harm to
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the Yemen population. As one member put it, the “American Bombs would reach Yemeni
civilians before American aid will” (House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs
2019). Yemen is only one of multiple examples where the United States has provided
contradictory ways of security, preventing the realization of a solution. If humans are innately
kind beings, and we hurt when we see another hurt, how does the United States choose when
deciding which “distant other” to help? The answer lies in human nature itself.
I will focus on the United States and their motivation to aid humanitarian crises through three
case studies. To realize how the United States is motivated to help, humanity’s predispositions
must be well-defined, alongside their established geopolitical interests. It is easy to feel empathy
for loved ones or family members, but how does empathy translate with someone in a foreign
country? At our core, humans seek interaction and cooperation among others. Who and how they
decide to cooperate with defines the intervention strategies. If we can understand how the
individual selects their in-group, these tendencies will reflect at the state level leadership. The
beginning of the paper outlines the transition of the individual to the formation of the state so that
we can recognize why the United States selects certain states over others. This will be
demonstrated through the progression from individuals, tribes, to governing bodies.
Starting at the individual level, humans have the capacity for social empathy, but they are
also balancing an inclination to violence. As Frans de Waal observes, we are a “bipolar” species.
It becomes easier to suppress violence when individuals or groups feel included and respected by
their government and families (Raine 1538). I will apply Elizabeth Segal’s definition of social
empathy, which is the ability to read and understand the feelings and actions of others with the
experiences of different societal groups (Segal xii). Once the individual and tribal levels are
understood, I intend to show how this relates to the United States’ involvement in humanitarian
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crises. Finally, I will utilize this knowledge of human nature to three cases: the Berlin Blockade,
a successful intervention carried out by the United States, Rwanda, a case that was largely
ignored until the United States sent troops by the end of the genocide, and Syria, an ongoing
humanitarian crisis in which the United States is directly involved. I unravel the complexity of
the United States’ intervention behavior through the psychology of humanity.

From the Newborn to Youth Stage
Humanity has various predispositions, some being innate, and others being shaped by the
environment in which they live. This development begins at birth, where individuals and society
interact. Before one can comprehend the intricacy of those who govern the state and its
strategies, it is necessary to highlight where our predispositions develop and evolve. Certain
inclinations could explain outcomes at the state level. If this is the case, what exactly are
humanity’s predispositions, and how do they impact society? This section will unpack what we
see as our obligations, starting as soon as one enters the world. Naturally, newborns signify the
beginning of an individual’s development. It is shown that babies prefer familiar kinds of people
almost immediately (Bloom 104). From an early age, it is expected one will make distinctions
between those who should be within your group, and those who should remain outside. Human
history has largely proved that moral obligations extend to only known neighbors. As Emily
Dickinson wrote, “The soul selects her own society / Then shuts the door” (Bloom 101). These
inclinations speak to who we decide is in our community, and who must remain outside.
There are certain ways that humans define their in-group and out-group. For babies, how they
interact with strangers seems to be a widely studied experience, and the qualities that they assign
the unknown dictate who is the in-group. Evolutionarily, strangers ignite fear, anger, and distrust.
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These feelings serve a protective purpose, suggesting the innate desire for cultural identification.
This is evident in many facets of society, specifically through the actions of the newborn. As
humans, we tend to be more comfortable with the familiar, and it has increased our chance of
survival throughout much of our evolutionary history. By gravitating towards the familiar at a
young age, one avoids unnecessary risks. What we are exposed to at birth impacts the perception
of the outside world. An example would be that babies favor the language they have been
exposed to and disapprove of foreign accents. Additionally, preferences for similar gender and
race matter. In multiple studies conducted on babies, they had a positive reaction to someone of
their same gender and race (Bloom 108). In terms of defining and maintaining kinship, these
tendencies, even at the stage of the baby, prove the importance of in-group identity and the desire
to pass down one’s biological traits.
From the newborn to the adolescence phase, not all behavior is limited to biological
tendencies. Many behavioral traits are fostered through socialization. In other words, we are not
doomed to feel empathy or compassion only for our in-group or kin. Based upon one’s
upbringing, biological fate can be adjusted. Therefore, an individual who has been limited to
exposure will have a narrow scope of who they consider their in-group. Rather than only feeling
compassion for someone who looks or acts like yourself, environmental factors can expand an
individual’s moral circle, invoking connections to complete strangers. Philosopher Peter Singer
speaks on the moral circle, where the perceived shared fate can alter who we wish to include
within the in-group (Norenzayan 72). For instance, children who attended schools with mixed
races were more likely to ignore race as a divisive factor. Children who attended racially
homogenous schools were increasingly hesitant (Bloom 119). Exposure to an “other” is essential
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by the adolescence stage. What this evidence points towards, as the analysis widens to governing
bodies, is that humans tend to favor those who are familiar.
A part of the process to accept certain individuals and not others is conducting moral
evaluations. Humanity is distinct from other species in our ability to “paint” moral qualities on
behavior. Since the human mind cannot observe the moral value of individuals, they learn to
make that evaluation through their own awareness. Once born, it becomes necessary to work
through the complexity of what is right or wrong. This is key to the developing mind, for it is
dependent upon paying attention to another humans’ behavior: what they do and how they speak
(Boyer 17). Particularly, the difference between moral and immoral behaviors do not reside in
the behaviors themselves. Adolescents soon realize that moral value is not black and white.
Giving away your money may be criminal while fighting people may be commendable. These
are shared mental representations, and one’s environment will reaffirm the observations. The
environment one is raised in can influence their behavior. Observing an adolescent’s behavior
and environment can lend a hand in understanding how they will interact with their community.

Analyzing the Individual Level: Adulthood
At a young age, humans demonstrate the need to define their community and belonging. While
the developmental years are crucial to who a person becomes, how exactly do these
predispositions and experiences compound into adulthood? The answer is multifaceted. As
mentioned above, primatologist Frans de Waal explains that we are a bipolar species, capable of
“cooperation, teamwork, love, friendship, empathy, kindness, forgiveness, compromise, and
reconciliation” as well as “competition, factionalism, hostility, sadism, cruelty, intransigence,
and domination” (Raine 1530). Historically, there is debate over which side of our nature,
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violence or empathy, can prevail. At the core, survival is on the minds of individuals. If
individuals feel safe and respected, they will be less likely to engage in violence. Exploring each
tendency, it appears that these are in constant competition with one another. Even academic
scholarship does not agree which trait, or if either, prevails. However, it is important to outline
our inclinations to distinguish who we help and who we hurt. This section details the manner that
violence is present in humanity, applying the parasite prevalence theory, and our capacity for
empathy to show how the United States deescalates conflict. It also informs why military versus
humanitarian aid are prioritized.
Violence is rooted in the evolutionary need for protection against periods of instability. The
rewards for aggression can be vast, increasing power, resources, offspring, and social hierarchy
(Raine 1540). According to the World Health Organization, violence is, “the intentional use of
physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group
or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death,
psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation” (Liddle 24). Violence is seen in both
nonhuman animals and humans, and there are many similarities and differences in their methods
to violence. Violence is not limited to the relations of predator and prey. It is even found among
the same species. Hence, human to human violence has been studied by evolutionary
psychologists to find out what provokes these actions. Through the evolutionary psychology lens,
psychologist James Liddle expands upon why humanity’s violence is a combination of the brain
composition of information-progressing mechanisms as well as the response to adaptive
problems faced by our ancestors. There is a combination of nature and nurture to know why
humans are violent. Liddle does not discount human experience in the analysis.
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Violence is an effective method to assert control, and this desire to control is prevalent today.
In the media, horrific acts from one human to another appear to be the subject of many news
stories. It seems that every day brings a new opportunity to showcase humanity’s true colors.
However, these violent actions are not new to the modern world. Violence among humans has
occurred for hundreds of thousands of years. Archaeological findings prove violence amongst the
early humans in the skeletons of the Paleolithic period (Liddle 28). Prior to the Paleolithic
period, other evidence points to violence since skeletons could not be preserved. At least 400,000
years ago, there were tools crafted to inflict severe violence on other humans, such as stone axes
and wooden spears (Liddle 31). What these findings illuminate is the innate, evolutionary
tendency for the individual to turn to violence. Whether through human to human contact or
through tools, violence is not a novel phenomenon in the human experience. There are certain
circumstances where this tendency is heightened.
As individuals form tribes and eventually societies, one way of protecting status within the
group is through violence. For the majority of their evolutionary history, violence was present
among the small groups of humanity. People lived in these smaller scale societies where most
individuals were familiar with another. With this familiarity came the need to be known for
strength. Status was particularly important in terms of survival. If an individual failed to defend
their status, it would have been costly, especially for men. As a result, violence has been a useful
outlet to combat perceived threats (Liddle 27). Then, when society expanded, individual
sensitivity to threats increased. The shift from nomadic lifestyles to permanent settlements
caused individuals to confront the unfamiliar. Human engagement in warfare spiked with the
abundance of resources and the advantages of conquering neighbors. It was the creation of an
interconnected network, where certain groups capitalized on the other. This is especially
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noteworthy for what eventually became states and their ability to share resources. Specifically,
the solutions to benefit a disadvantaged state may not be in the interest of the privileged state.
The turn to violence as an outlet for survival can explain why a state acts on their self-interests.
Self-interest can still be achieved through cooperation. This is also tied to the aim for
survival. Liddle elaborates that the reduced possibility for cooperation between groups is
accounted for by the idea of individual parasite prevalence. As commonly perceived, parasites
have a negative impact on survival. Parasites have brought adaptive problems since humans try
to resist infection. We have evolved to detect local parasites and avoid infection. Beyond actual
parasites, this theory addresses how humanity reacts to other threats on their in-group. Within the
parasite stress model, the psychological devices that assess parasite prevalence encourage
behavior that manage the risk of exposure (Thornhill, Fincher, Murray & Schaller, 2010). This
reaffirms the in-group versus out-group distinction. Particularly, in areas of high parasite stress,
humanity tends to value decreased interaction with outgroup members. The ingroup becomes the
inner circle, and values such as collectivism, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia are embraced. This
lack of cooperation lends itself to a world where individuals suffer poverty, inequality, and
violence for competing resources.
The parasite prevalence theory operates among individuals who make up the different in and
out groups. It can be applied to determine points of conflict and how they would decide to work
together. An example of parasite prevalence would be an infectious disease and its effect on the
frequency of warfare. For instance, the parasite-stress model can demonstrate the manner in
which a global infectious disease leads to xenophobic and ethnocentric cultural norms, as the
ingroup tries to protect themselves against the potential harm of the out-group. This holds true in
both intrastate and interstate conflict. Specifically, intrastate conflict occurs between states, and
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interstate conflict within the state. Intrastate conflict occurs as the in-group demotes the
outgroup, leaving them with little support and left to isolation. Interstate conflict occurs when the
out-group, generally those who suffer great poverty, are left with mortality and deprivation from
the persistent disease. Resource competition ensues, and the nation has an increased chance for
civil war (Letendre et al. 669). This not only informs violence, but the cultural norms of the
ingroup and the out-group. Parasite prevalence is an evolutionary trait that demonstrates how we
protect ourselves and how this protection can lead to division. Although parasite is in the name,
the theory speaks more about human cooperation than avoiding disease. It confirms in what way
individuals navigate exterior threats to the in-group.
Identifying these tendencies towards violence leaves behind a bleak fortune for humanity.
Nevertheless, human nature is not destined for savagery, destruction, and self-interest. In the
context of safety and respect, humanity can feel empathy and compassion for one another. It is
the combination of biological and environmental factors on the developing mind that largely
dictate whether individuals will turn to violence or empathy. This dilemma is exaggerated by the
increased interactions that individuals moved as a society from isolated tribal bands to the
interconnected modern world. Humans remain to be social beings. It is even necessary for one to
feel empathy in order to have successful social interactions between humans (Miralles 3).
Reaching adulthood, we have developed abilities to understand other people’s states of mind, or
to make sense of their behavior. The inability to know the minds of others would be an immense
disadvantage for survival. This aptitude for empathy is unique because we not only apprehend
each other’s minds, but we can envision ourselves in the position from a first-person perspective.
Empathy allows us to become full members of society (Stueber 5). Hence, we must confront our
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predispositions to violence, and remain aware that we are simultaneously capable of expressing
empathy.
Although empathy and compassion appear to be similar qualities, it is notable to distinguish
what they mean for human expression. With these definitions clarified, we can learn the
motivations of the United States involvement in another state’s humanitarian crisis. It especially
specifies the motivations of helping the distant other. Empathy is the ability to recognize others’
states of mind, and to make sense of their behavior. Compassion, while it may contain attributes
of empathy, should not be confused with empathy. It is too concerned with unfortunate
situations, for we do not have compassion for people who are doing well (Segal 25). In other
terms, it invokes an appeal to charitable feelings, but it is limited in this scope. There is
disagreement among scholarship on whether human understanding should focus on empathy or
compassion. Paul Bloom writes his book on Against Empathy, arguing that compassion is more
rational than the emotionally loaded trait of empathy. Responding to his critique, Elizabeth Segal
believes empathy is rational, and more importantly, that it is a process one learns over a lifetime.
This thesis utilities Segal’s definition of social empathy, which states that empathy is the ability
to read and understand the feelings and actions of others with an appreciation of their history.
Both scholars inform the debate, but Segal’s definition of social empathy prevails for this study.
This analysis focuses on social empathy because it allows one to comprehend the experiences
of different societal groups. Social empathy can be explained in a real example that occurred in
the United States. Utilizing the looting that took place post-Hurricane Katrina, Segal comes to
terms with the fact that if she were in the looter’s shoes, she would have reacted similarly in
order to survive (Segal 2). This requires the application of social empathy because one must go
further than focusing on the impact of the hurricane. It mandates that an individual face the
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contextual features of the crisis, where largely African American and poorer communities
inhabited. Social empathy takes a deeper look into structures, desiring change for social
conditions to build a better world. Even though Segal had not experienced anything similar to
living through the natural disaster, she employed social empathy after considering the bigger
picture. Regardless if the matter concerns your sister or a complete stranger, empathy is a
powerful tool for connection. Empathy confirms that we are capable beings who can comprehend
the lives of those we do not live. This capacity for social empathy continues to be vital in
evaluating why aid is provided for certain humanitarian crises.
The three case studies stretch a broad range of the United States’ history. Spanning multiple
decades of the 20th century to the present, the studies showcase how our predispositions control
which states we help or hurt. Paul Ehrlich believes that we have lost touch with this power to
connect, due to many societal constraints discussed further (Ehrlich 9). To make this connection
achievable, even in a world of increasing polarization and other various barriers, one must
cultivate empathy. The capacity for empathy should be recognized while acknowledging our past
plagued by genocide and enslavement. Empathy is contextual, making it a fluid process
depending on the circumstance. As individuals, we can train ourselves to be more empathetic,
whether we ourselves are sad or too tired to engage. President Obama argued that there is an
“empathy deficit” where most people do not relate to a broad enough part of humanity (Ehrlich
9). This deficit is not irreversible. It begins by knowing when to take action, an action that
another may need. One question begins the discussion of the following case studies: can the
United States exercise social empathy selectively, and if so, can we train ourselves to be more
empathetic? Transitioning from the individual to the organization of tribes, this idea of the
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“empathy deficit” will be important to keep in mind, especially for the case studies of the 21 st
century.

Tribal Organization and the Family Unit
Before advancing to the state’s decision-making, it is essential to frame how individuals join
together to create organized communities. These findings detail the state’s formation, through
shared identities and further aggression to outsiders. The previous section spoke upon empathy
and its power in building connections. Jeremy Rifkin elaborates on empathy’s role in group
formation. Rifkin makes it clear that this is difficult since tribal life offered little contact between
tribes (Segal 45). It is not inherently wrong to be proud of your own group, for people do not
wish to lose their cultural identification (Bloom 128). An individual’s longing to come together
and coexist has brought many advantages to humanity. Yet, the formation of tribes and families
has equally many consequences. The development of an “in-group” inevitability creates an
“outgroup.” Margaret Mead addresses the romantic view of small-scale societies and makes note
that the appeals of kinship and belonging comes with a cost. Transitioning from the tribe to
modern society was a gradual process. Every new advancement towards collective organization
offered an answer to the core problem that society was bound to face. It is evident to see qualities
of tribal organization in governing bodies today, as well as the characteristics that have been lost.
Starting with the tribal formation, this section communicates the way that tribes have shaped
societies in the modern world.
The progression from the tribe to how we see society today was not instantaneous. There are
four main forms of organization that are the foundation to governance and evolution of all
societies across all time periods. These four include the tribal form, the institutional form, the
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market form, and the network form (Ronfeldt 1). The tribal form was the first to emerge,
beginning thousands of years ago. Considering its benefits, it is apparent they are still reaped
today. These tribal instincts provide a sense of social identity and union which is still the basis of
every society. Evolving from the hunter-gatherer lifestyle of nomadic bands, tribes became
progressively settled, agrarian, and village lifestyle. It differs from chiefdoms and states due to
its lack of formal hierarchies (Rondfeldt 30). Self-interest is not prioritized, for one’s identity is
found in their lineage. In this stage, kinship controls all decisions through thought and action,
limiting the means to advance. The tribe is concerned with the well-being of one another. If
selfinterest prevails, the singular tribe does not independently exist, for they are to be
overpowered by the interests of one.
Kinship empowers the need for hierarchy or a central authority that dictates the community.
This is the next stage of grouping labeled hierarchical institutions. The chiefdom encompasses
the larger, denser, diverse populations, ruling over the larger set of villages (Rondfeldt 44). With
greater complexity came increased stability, resisting the division of tribes. While the chiefdom
led to the development of the state and the military, the tribal inclinations never fully left the
structural framework. In fact, when societal progression fails, it historically tends to revert to
tribal tendencies. The longing for “egalitarianism, mutual caring, sharing, reciprocity, collective
responsibility, group solidarity, family, community, civility, and democracy” are all tribal
principles (Rondfeldt 56). As society advanced, these ideals were believed less in the ways of
kinship, but rather in the relation between the ruler and the ruled. With this separation from tribal
life, additional values were necessary.
These additional values show the rise of the market form, enabling individuals to channel
their drive for competition, selfish individualism. Taken too far, the market principles
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overshadow the positive tribal impulses that promote social trust and behavior in the market
system. Balance is needed in any stage of society, and tribalism never fully leaves. Rondfeldt
articulates this balance in the triform model. By triform, it is meant that these societies include
aspects of the tribe, institution, and market. The United States has built the most advanced
triform, including tribal instincts, institutional hierarchies, market, and is now on track to create a
quadriform society. Reaching the quadriform would enable policymakers, business leaders, and
activists to cooperate spanning various networks. With the rise of globalization and technology,
this fourth form of networks connects groups and individuals outside of one’s state, which the
United States has developed to reach abroad (Rondfedlt 68). Certainly, there are other states in
the modern world who have begun to meet the level of the United States, such as Russia and
China. However, these states are limited to adapting the market form, not necessarily the triform.
From the viewpoint of the United States, they have networks of allies and relationships that span
decades.
The triform and quadriform models have allowed for a globalized society, which is
significant for the leader of a state to feel empathy for another state. An ability to visit and learn
about the distant other was a feature unknown to tribal organizations. Therefore, densely
populated living has made cross-cultural exchange possible. This still proves difficult for
humanity, for a bond that resembles blood relationships was and remains an adjustment. In the
past two thousand years, there has been both advancement and setbacks to cultural coexistence
(Segal 46). Psychologist Steven Pinker believes that empathy, although not equally experienced
in all places across the world, has developed far beyond what earlier civilizations experienced.
Within the organization of city-states, the impulse for economic gain permits different groups to
live together. The cosmopolitan life of the current stage forced civilization to understand their
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trading partners and various cultures (Segal 47). Pinker argues that this has led to a decline in
violence, since a core cause of tribal violence was the limitations in how much they can produce.
It was anticipated for a tribe, once attacked, to retaliate, creating a cycle of violence. Today’s
advancements support the benefits for different cultures to coexist, whether for economic gain or
because of their densely populated arrangements. These are advantages of the newest stage of
society.
While the latest stages of society have proven our aptitude to coexist and trade with other
cultures, the human concern for others in the modern world is a complicated story. In Sebastian
Junger’s Tribe: On Homecoming and Belonging, Junger speaks to the experience of veterans
coming home from war. The feelings of post-traumatic stress disorder, coupled with the
sentiments of courage, loyalty, and selflessness, have left many soldiers to wonder why they still
long for tribal life. This leads Junger to ask: why is Western life so unappealing (Junger 15)? For
the first time ever, an individual can go about their entire day encountering only strangers. This
had led to deep struggles with mental illness and overall standards of happiness. Whereas the
triform and quadriforms of progression offer comforts and basic needs fulfilled for many, it also
has made individuals feel immensely alone. A wealthy person who never had to rely on help or
resources from his community is living a life that is far outside the centuries of human
experience (Junger 25). There appears to be a reduced role of community in the most advanced
form of society. How does this affect the United States, the wealthiest country in the world, and
its capacity to help in humanitarian causes? The following section will address these concerns.
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The Institutions that Contribute to Societal Formation
An individual’s predispositions can reveal how a society maneuvers difficult or urgent situations.
In the context of the modern world, it may be taken for granted that once disaster strikes,
international aid will play a major role in the recovery. When did this become possible, and why
is it now taken for granted? It is understood that humanity is both innately empathetic,
compassionate, and violent, but there are many intricacies that require further examination. An
individual’s predispositions are not the only factor in determining the ways in which aid is given.
The role that institutions, including religion, as well as the history of humanitarian aid, play will
be noteworthy to develop. Although individuals can bring insightful contributions, it is not
guaranteed that international aid will be provided. From the vantage point of the first tribal
formations, an interconnected world is an unnatural system. A tribe may never cross paths with
another who lives only a few miles away. Humanity was once in small bands, worried about their
kin, and the modern world has new expectations of dependency. Today, it is anticipated that
states will work together in hopes for the global common good. Proven in the novel coronavirus,
when dire challenges emerge, international systems hope to work together to shuttle supplies
globally. The history begins with the earthquake in Lisbon, a natural disaster that serves as a
catalyst for the trend in international aid. This section highlights the history of international aid,
as well as the institution of religion, and what they entail for the state’s ethical responsibility.
On November 1, 1755, Lisbon faced an 8.5 magnitude earthquake, historically the largest
to hit a major European city. In addition to the devastating earthquake, the city went up in flames
due to a great fire from overturned candles. To make matters worse, the ocean floor pushed tidal
waves more than sixty feet high towards Lisbon. It made many aware that nature’s capabilities
are largely out of our control. With that being said, the ethical obligations to suffering people in
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distant lands arose. This moment in time became, as political scientist Michael Barnett named it,
the “Humanitarian Big Bang” (McCullough 2020). Immediately following the tragedy, monarchs
from Spain, France, Britain, and Hamburg provided economic aid to Portugal. As anticipated, the
countries had their own political and economic self-interests to satisfy. Even so, the response was
unprecedented. Analyzing the zero-sum perspective of international relations in the 18th century,
it would have been expected to see Portugal’s loss as a win for surrounding states. The outcome
was quite the contrary.
Rather, there was a call that the nations owe an ethical responsibility to one another.
Emmerich de Vattel’s The Law of Nations, written shortly after the earthquake, details how “one
state owes to another state whatever it owes to itself, so far as that other stands in real need of its
assistance, and the former can grant it without neglecting the duties it owes to itself”
(McCullough 2020). Vattel is arguing that a state should be concerned about another’s welfare,
and they are obligated to help. The earthquake symbolized a starting point for humanitarian aid,
as well as a new view of religion. Historically, supernatural explanations were mostly employed
because they were widely accepted. Since the Lisbon earthquake occurred on All Saint’s Day,
many leaders donated their resources because it was seen as punishment for human wickedness.
Others started to wonder whether science, reason, and large-scale international efforts could be
enforced to reduce misery in distant lands. The religious revolution was a pivotal moment for
humanitarian affairs.
The United States has a prevalent religious influence, which means this institution must
be addressed. Religion has transformed the ability for cooperation and conflict. It establishes
trust and a set of moral values to follow. Here, the world’s most economically powerful and
scientifically advanced country, is also one of the most religious (Norenzayan 2). Human
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existence relied on organizing themselves in cooperative societies. Especially in the present day,
strangers regularly depend on each other for mutual livelihood. It is not the possibility of future
interaction that persuades strangers to want to work together. Instead, it is the reputation and
threat of punishment that impacts cooperative behavior (Norenzayan 5). Religion helps
individuals measure one’s reputation and establish standards of morality. Prosocial religions,
those with Big Gods who watch and intervene, contribute to the rise of cooperation in large
groups of strangers. Believing and belonging to a cultural community influenced people to come
together as a cohesive whole for a greater cause. This strengthens the bonds in large groups
under the control of the state and can motivate altruistic activity.
Religion as a societal institution has created trust among people who trust in God. The
idea that “watched people are nice people” removes the additional work of understanding an
individual’s reputation (Norenzayan 59). For instance, there is more generosity when charities
raise money in public. It is this form of social monitoring that exists because of super-natural
monitoring. Before modern cultural institutions, like police or courts, it was religion that dictated
the actions of communities. Today, this notion has persisted. Looking to political candidates,
atheism has shown to be the least likeable quality (Norenzayan 67). Although religion is not the
only motivation to act altruistically, such as the expectation of mutual gain or Singer’s notion of
expanding your moral circle, it remains a large source of instilling cooperation. On the other
hand, there is a secular application toward reassuring nice behavior: strong institutions that
enforce fair competition and ensure that cheaters will be punished (Norenzayan 73). In these
societies, believers and nonbelievers alike are motivated to cooperate and feel prosocial. This
shows that feelings of cooperation are not necessarily instituted by religion, but religion has
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played a great role in creating caring communities. With its great presence in the United States it
is a worthy contribution to how American society has been organized.
Even with religion’s ability to bring people together, there are religious groups within the
same state that conflict. We find ourselves in an unfamiliar international system that argues
cooperation among different states should be maintained, when the states themselves are often in
disagreement. This international system is far removed from the tribal organization that once
established group formation. It is easy to forget the current international system has asked a lot
of state leaders, with the concept of international aid being fairly new. Some scholars make the
claim that morality has been banished from international affairs, and particularly in the past
halfcentury. Robert McElroy argues this is because there is a need to establish international
affairs exclusively from all ethical and philosophical presuppositions, and the impact that realism
has had on states (McElroy 3). These realist ideals, which remove the choice for moral values
that conflict with national interest, have made it taboo to discuss ethics in international affairs.
However, scholars like Charles Beitz, Marshall Cohen, and J.E. Hare challenge the realist notion
by stating that all political action is goal-oriented, and moral principles address concerns in
international affairs. They go as far to say that foreign policy is, “intrinsically a domain of moral
choice” (McElroy 4).
These scholars, understood as liberal internationalists, viewed the increasing support for
peaceful resolution and partnered efforts to provide humanitarian aid as evidence of true
international morality (McElroy 8). Arising in the early twentieth century, they were encouraged
that this growing support for international morality would be more cohesive as the twentieth
century continued. After World War II and the democratization of the West, the liberal
internationalists showed that international relations could now incorporate morality in their
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decision-making processes (McElroy 13). Once this movement arose, the question evolved into
whether or not a state was responsible to neutralize potential threats? What justified prevention
and intervention implementation? Finally, what can be determined as a “good” foreign policy?
All of these inquiries add to the difficulties of deciding how and when to intervene in another
state’s affairs. The United States is left in a novel international system that is shifting. These
questions surrounding ethical responsibility will remain important in the discussion of the
American involvement in foreign matters.
Governing Bodies – The United States
The societal structures that influence charitable behavior and cooperation find themselves under
the control of the state. Considering these influences, the state, in this case, the United States, has
structured a portion of their budget to benefit foreign aid. The funds are allocated to continually
support the development of other countries, while other areas prioritize moments of emergency.
Yet, for the United States, foreign aid remains one of the most controversial components of US
foreign policy (Guess xi). Analyzing the five programs that U.S. foreign aid consists of:
Economic Support Fund, Development Assistance, Food Aid, Security Assistance, and
Multilateral Development Banks, these programs are often interrelated and have vague task
delegations. The controversy lies in the U.S. foreign aid ending in largely uneven results, hoping
to achieve its American values abroad (Guess 3). “American values” refers to having a world
order that supports freedom as well as political, economic, and social sustainability. It is assumed
that the United States must increasingly pursue its national interests in a geopolitical
environment that is influenced by increasing competition with rival powers. Transitioning to the
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Biden administration, there are predictions that he will not view international relations through a
zero-sum prism similar to the Trump administration (McCurdy et al. 2021). With these large aims,
there are restrictions to which states can receive U.S. funding and structural support.
When delegating resources, U.S. foreign policy must consider the cost and return
considerations, or profitability. This complicates the ability to give for the leading decision
makers, as there are economic and political restraints on feeling empathy for another. Although
empathy may be a motivation to help a distant other, one cannot deny the economic influence at
play. An example would be congressional preference for distributing loans over grants, despite
the fact that the loans are rarely repaid in full (Guess 18). It can be argued historically that the
U.S. would rather demonstrate the illusion the state will repay for their assistance than give
directly through grant form. Over the last two decades, this trend has been altered. Nearly all
foreign aid is provided in grant form (Lawson and Morgenstern 16). This shift deserves
additional explanation. Throughout this section, the funding process of the United States will be
described in order to know how these foreign state selections are made.
Humanitarian relief was the first phase of U.S. foreign aid. Beginning in 1943, and
discontinued in 1947, the U.S. provided 70% of the funds to the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) (Guess 19). The purpose of the UNRRA was to prevent
starvation and the basic survival needs for those in the Axis-occupied countries, specifically
based in Southern Europe, China, Korea, and the Philippines. This agency, which was dismantled
by the creation of the United Nations, was the first time the United States formally allocated
resources to humanitarian relief. The aid, further politicized by fear of supporting the communist
agenda, reflects the budgetary and political concerns of today’s relief funds. These concerns will
shape how and when the United States is involved in the three case studies.
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The United States foreign assistance is the largest component of the international affairs
budget, and as of late, has focused on competing with China and Russia to address global
humanitarian crises. Humanitarian concerns, to the U.S., are defined as “driving both short-term
assistance in response to crisis and disaster as well as long-term development assistance aimed at
reducing poverty, fighting disease and other forms of human suffering…” (Lawson and
Morgenstern 4). In terms of the United States, the main focus is on short-term assistance, which
works to alleviate immediate human suffering in both natural and human induced crises. The
most recent fiscal year budget of 2018 shows that $8,345,840,000 was spent on humanitarian
assistance (Lawson and Morgenstern 5).
This money is distributed to many outlets, the largest portion through the International
Disaster Assistance. The organization has responded to crises in Syria, South Sudan, Yemen and
Venezuela, while coordinating for food assistance with the Emergency Food Security Program.
The additional assistance reaches programs by the State Department, funded under the Migration
and Refugee Assistance and the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance accounts. From
there, these accounts support organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross
(Lawson and Morgenstern 8). United States’ foreign aid stretches many countries and takes a
variety of forms. As the case studies progress throughout the decades, organized aid is
increasingly established, reinforcing the structure for foreign assistance. For instance, the
situation in Syria benefits from more programs like the International Disaster Assistance than
were existent at the time of the Berlin Blockade.
The sum of eight billion dollars for humanitarian aid appears to be a large and fair
amount to achieve the aims of American assistance. However, reflecting on the United States’
humanitarian budget and the manner in which it is allocated, its current organization is up for
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debate. When accounting for the percentage of gross national income, the United States ranks
low with its aid calculated to the gross national income (Lawson and Morgenstern 26). This
raises many concerns, such as to what extent this great power provides aid for states with lower
national incomes? Furthermore, how should this aid be presented? Is the answer to increase the
budget or reorganize the allocation? These questions are all valid. There are particular techniques
for providing aid that achieve diplomatic outcomes. Diplomacy is rhetorically and idealistically
the way that the United States expects to achieve its short-term intervention strategies. By
considering the differences between military aid and foreign aid, it appears that foreign aid is the
more “peaceful” way to respond to issues of political stability around the world (Guess 18).
Military aid can be described as the United States providing countries with American military
equipment and training. Of course, military aid is necessary in intervention strategies, some cases
more than others. Often, as shown in the following case studies, immediate military involvement
could lead to long-term intervention, with the U.S. risking their own people and resources for a
cause. The distinction between military and foreign aid will be especially important in
understanding the Berlin Blockade, Rwanda, and Syria. As of the 2018 fiscal year budget, $13.6
billion was allocated for military assistance, making 29% of the total US foreign aid (Lawson
and Morgenstern 9). If the U.S. should increase their aid for humanitarian crises, they must
decide whether it will prioritize military or foreign aid. The following case studies will prove this
distinction’s significance, as there are instances where military aid is useful.
Among their rich history in humanitarian intervention and its status as a global power, the
United States has often been regarded as an influential player in global foreign policy. We do not
hold countries like France or Germany to the same expectation as the United States because of
its larger material power and resources. Predominantly, its authority over their allies, as well as
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their enemies, means American intervention strategies carry immense weight in the international
system. The three cases discussed point to different decades in American history, and the
leadership at each moment in time had and continues to make difficult moral evaluations. Given
its status and resources, the United States’ leadership often considers how their intervention, or
lack thereof, will impact the international system. Michael Walzer offers a rhetorical question on
the duty of humanitarian intervention: “if not us, then who?” (Rosenthal and Barry 15).
Comprehending the hierarchy of global powers, it is evident that the United States is qualified to
aid other countries. Nevertheless, how does this ability compound with the complexity of human
predispositions? In other words, human beings are operating at the governing level of the United
States. When foreign or military aid is implemented, is humanity’s biology to blame? With paths
to both violence and compassion, there appears a moral dilemma among American leadership.
These difficulties will be detailed as the case studies are explored.

State Versus the Individual Distinction
Before the case studies will be outlined and related to the innate tendencies of humanity, it is
worth making a distinction between what will be evaluated. Specifically, the leadership at the
time of each crisis signals the decisions that were made for the intervention strategy. I do not
suggest that the state can be identified as a person entirely. Instead, I claim that the United States
approach to humanitarian concerns could be linked to our innate predispositions. After all, the
state’s leaders who make these crucial decisions are human. To argue that states themselves are
“actors” or “persons” is to insinuate they alone have attributes with human beings, such as
rationality, identities, interests, or beliefs (Jackson 289). Many scholars of International
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Relations would agree that states are not really people, only as if ones. Another way one can
comprehend this is that a state operates based on the leadership in power at the time. Wendt
quotes that this title is “useful fiction,” for the state is a social construction of the mind, and thus
cannot be anything more than the material facts that constitute them (Jackson 299). The state
cannot take credit for the actions of leaders. If a state is a person, the concern is that only the
state as a whole can be held responsible for “crimes against humanity” (Jackson 258).
When we examine the crises in Berlin, Rwanda, and Syria, we must keep in mind how the
decisions of their leadership at the time reflect what we know about humanity. This paper values
the relevant executive and what they may have relied upon to make the careful and challenging
judgments. The United States had differing priorities in the time span of these crises, which will
also be significant to remember. In the three case studies: Berlin Blockade, Rwanda, and Syria,
humanity’s tendencies can shed light on the manner in which involvement takes place in dire
situations. Keeping in mind humanity’s desire for violence and empathy, two extremes on a
spectrum, the following studies reveal a great deal about humanity. Each case will start with
background on its extraordinary conditions and then outline connections to the previous sections.
They highlight the past, present, and anticipate the future of American foreign aid.

II.

Case Studies

Berlin Blockade
Ending in almost an entire destruction of Germany, the war of Adolf Hitler that began in 1939
came to an end in May 1945. This left the state in the hands of the Allied powers, those being the
United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union. Discussions ensued about how Germany would
be rebuilt in the post-war era. At the Potsdam meeting in July 1945, the Allied powers agreed
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their forces should construct Germany (Miller 1). With this, the original German administration
would be dismantled, and the Soviet zone occupied the eastern third of the nation, the British and
American portions divided the Western portion of the nation, and France made a portion out of
the Western zones. Inside the Soviet Zone of Occupation, the Allied powers also agreed to divide
the German capital of Berlin into sectors among the four powers. This decision to divide Berlin,
a city inside the Soviet Occupation Zone, would be the foundation to the Berlin Crisis of 1948,
where the case study truly begins.
West Berlin during the 1940’s was a significant location for the United States’ and
democratic interests. While the war was officially over, the tensions and damage inside Berlin in
particular were undeniable. As of May 1945, the Berlin population of 4.6 million was down to
2.8 million people. Bomb destruction led to sewer system malfunctions, disease, less housing
space, food shortages, and a decreased medical infrastructure (Miller 3). This went on for two
months without the presence of Western troops, since the Soviet Union refused their ability to
enter. In the chaos of World War II coming to a close, the Allied powers had not formally agreed
for Western access into Berlin by surface transportation. By the time that Soviets first entered
Berlin, they spread misinformation to the Germans, hoping to convince them that they had solely
saved the city from Nazi occupation. The Soviet Secretary General Joseph Stalin had a long-term
goal regarding the possibilities of Berlin. By increasing their power in Berlin, they would have
authority in the eastern occupation zone and could decrease the British involvement. Finally,
they calculated that the United States would only last a few more years before they withdrew
their troops (Hanson 42). In this seamless scenario, the Soviets could control not only Berlin but
all of Germany.
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The Soviet Union did not have intentions to work alongside the United States, however,
the same was to be said from the American perspective. Ideally, President Truman would have
wanted to reach an agreement with Stalin. These expectations that the United States and the
Soviet Union would be able to work together amicably was quickly disproven. Although the
original objectives were to maintain a short-term post-war presence in Europe, knowing well that
Germany played a major role in stabilizing Europe, the United States needed to change their
tactics. And the Soviet Union was not going to let up on their own agenda. Looking for relentless
revenge for the harm inflicted by the Germans in World War II, the Soviet Union made it a goal
to achieve reparations. The Potsdam agreement made it possible for those in control of their zone
to seize reparations. For the Soviet controlled zones, this meant the rape or murder of women in
astounding numbers and loss of 2 million industrial jobs (Miller 6). An environment of despair
and destruction was fostered in these areas.
The American presence in West Berlin would remain until a Western German
government could be established. As the Red Army advanced into Eastern Europe, moving the
Russian-Polish border westward, Poland gained almost a quarter of Germany’s most fertile land
and displaced several million Germans, mostly from the Western zones (Miller 2). The Soviet
dictator made the conditions of the German people unbearable. When the Soviets first entered
Berlin, they spread misinformation to the Germans, hoping to convince them that they had solely
saved the city from Nazi occupation. Stalin failed to realize he would need to convince the hearts
and minds of the Germans to achieve his expansionist plans. By mid-1946, Stalin altered his
plans from retribution to reconciliation, but the harsh Soviet occupation was irredeemable
(Miller 6). This placed the United States in a desirable position to convince Germany that the
Western democracy was a future worth fighting towards. Relying on the tendencies of empathy
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and kindness over the desire for violence and control, the United States and Great Britain are a
stark contrast from the Soviet reign. The destruction of World War II and the Soviet pillage left
eastern Germany in economic ruin. There began massive anti-communist protest votes,
especially in the Soviet sector of Berlin that reflected the blame for suffering on the Soviets
(Miller 8).
Although the United States maintained a popular position among the Germans, the
outstanding issue remained: how would American resources reach Berlin? There were
predictions that the United States’ forces would withdraw from Berlin to other West German
cities. West Berlin was not geographically sound and surrounded by more than 380,000 Soviet
troops in East Germany. This all shifted once the Soviet blockade began in 1948-1949 (Larson
180). By June 1948, the Soviet Union cut off ground and water access routes to West Berlin. In a
moment of crisis, the United States vowed to stay in West Berlin and supply the population by
air. Taking upon this large feat, President Truman decided to stay in West Berlin “come what
may,” relying solely on American airlifts (Larson 181). This was a bold move on the part of
President Truman, who did not attempt to use the blockade as an opportunity for the 1948
reelection or appeal to public impressions. He simply stated that they would remain in Berlin
until there was a permanent resolution, making no effort to convince his Cabinet advisers that the
airlift would work or that it could be a potential for permanent resolution (Miscamble 309). It
was at this time that President Truman made a decision solely out of what he believed to be right.
Despite all odds, the Berlin Blockade has now been argued as one of the most successful
humanitarian relief projects to date. There are many contributing factors to the American
involvement. In a moment that defined Western Europe and Western Germany, the United States
under President Truman was determined to defend against the threat of communism. This
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conflict demanded Americans to find unconventional ways in defending Berlin, as the traditional
means were no match for the Soviet occupation. Throughout this case study, Berlin will be
utilized as an example of an effective intervention, understanding why President Truman
proceeded with the “strategic liability” (Larson 182). It will also untangle the complexities of the
American involvement, which was motivated by the need to save humanity and a hostility
towards the communist agenda.
The plan started culmination in the summer of 1948, progressively disrupting
transportation and communication between the western zones and Berlin. While the United
States and the British questioned Soviet authority to place restrictions on Berlin, there was also
no written agreement made at the end of World War II preventing otherwise. Therefore, the
Soviet blockade of Berlin officially began on June 24, 1948. Coming from the end of an
extremely costly and tiring world war, American commitment to the crisis was not an easy
decision. Many scholars believe if it was not for President Truman’s undying will to maintain
American rights in Berlin, no matter the cost, the Soviet occupation would not have been
defeated (Harrington 88). The West acknowledged the severity of starving Berliners to influence
German hearts and minds. As resources in Berlin dwindled, the United States decision needed to
be made. President Truman took his time, balancing the concerns of both his advisors. He
understood that the moral obligation to the German population did not mean the commitment to
stay in Berlin as it did for his senior officer General Lucius Clay. On the other hand, there was
enough food and fuel in the city to last several weeks and jumping into another war would also
weigh on Berlin (Harrington 98). Those like General Clay believed that Berlin was worth
another war.
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In retrospect, this delay was advantageous to the United States, avoiding war and
Western humiliation. All the while, the Soviets placed pressure on the vulnerable civilians,
promising supplies in exchange for surrender. Around three months after the blockade began,
physicians from the Ministry of Health went to Berlin to examine the food and nutritional
circumstances. They reported back to the authorities, and their findings show the Berliners were
far below a healthy community. Generally speaking, Western Berliners were reliant on the airlift
for all of their necessities (Magee 622). Other than food, the airlift brought raw materials for
industry, fuel, clothing, and medical supplies. It prioritized carrying food for survival, with hopes
of fostering the foundation for successful communities. Through a Combined Airlift Task Force
(CALTF), which was under the United States Air Forces Europe, the coalition supplied Berlin.
Between June 26, 1948 to August 1, 1949, the airlift forces delivered more than 2,223,000 tons
of supplies (Brunhaver 21). All of this was done amid Soviet threats to airlifters. From the
blockade time period, there were 733 incidents involving Soviets and Allied aircrafts (Brunhaver
24).
Nevertheless, the coalition persisted against the Soviet sabotage and attacks. The Army
Transportation Corps were responsible for delivering supplies to the aircraft loading for
offloading in Berlin. Typically, under a twelve-man team, the plane would be off-loaded in six to
10 minutes (Brunhaver 25). As the air lifts circulated and established a rhythm of delivery, the
Allies, and particularly the United States, proved a peaceful resolution of conflict. This was
achieved through the use of nonlethal airpower. General Hoyt S. Vanderberg, the Chief of Staff
of the Air Force, explained it as, “the Berlin Airlift has provided the United States Air Force an
opportunity to demonstrate to the American people, whose instrument it is, and the world at
large, what it can do and what it will continue to do to the best of its ability to make air power a
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true force for peace” (Brunhaver 27). The lives of Berliners, United States servicemen, the future
of Germany, and the fight against the Soviet Union made President Truman remain until the job
was complete. This strong adherence to the humanitarian mission, as well as a political mission,
points to the United States’ capability of saving thousands of lives. Despite the odds against
them, President Truman and the other Allied powers came out victorious in a mission destined to
fail.
There is more to be said regarding the odds against the United States to resolve the
humanitarian crisis in Berlin. Through the lens of a foreign policymaker, a country should
intervene in a conflict if the state has sufficient power to achieve an objective at a reasonable
cost. For instance, the international political theory of realism makes the distinction between
“what is desirable and what is possible” (Larson 183). From a classical realist perspective, the
desire for the West to intervene in the Berlin Blockade is puzzling, as Berlin’s location was
vulnerable and had narrow avenues for defense. The failure of one’s country to gauge whether it
can achieve an objective at a reasonable cost could entail policy inconsistencies. By the time the
Soviet Union created the blockade, the only feasible method to bring supplies to the inhabitants
was by air. Reflecting upon the Soviet Union’s failure to supply Leningrad by air during World
War II, Allied military officials believed that the airlift would only be possible for a few months
(Larson 183). Distinctly, this was not the case. The United States’ achievement in Berlin did not
follow traditional realist theory in their decision-making.
According to a psychological theory that indicates professionals like pilots, physicians,
radiologists, or business executives often make decisions based on their intuitive judgment
instead of analysis. By intuitive judgment, it is meant these individuals tend to decide according
to what “feels right” (Larson 184). In these circumstances, where a situation can become
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increasingly uncertain, individuals rely on their intuition to guide them to the best resolution. It is
apparent that President Truman and the airlift pilots relied on some level to their intuition in the
Berlin Blockade. This connects to the research found earlier on humanity’s tendencies. When we
rely on our intuition in complex circumstances, there are certain qualities that humans trust. The
ability to decide what “feels right” is fostered at an early age, as discussed in the previous sections.
Conducting moral evaluations makes humanity distinct in our ability to “paint” moral qualities on
behavior. Since the human mind cannot observe the moral value of individuals, this skill has
assisted in increasing our own awareness. Beginning at birth, it is necessary to work through what
is right or wrong. What defines right and wrong depends upon the individual’s environment and
peers: what they do and how they speak (Boyer 17). For an American leader, their views of what
is “right” and “wrong” would differ from a leader that was raised in Russia.
The difficult decisions made around the airlift speaks to some level of our intuitive judgment.
Relating to the study on social empathy, President Truman, and the other Allied power
leadership, had to look at the “bigger picture” at hand. In a time of re-election, where President
Truman could have turned to violence for a quick end to the conflict, he instead found an
unpopular path to empathy. As examined previously, individuals have just as much capability for
violence as they do for empathy. In the example of the looting that took place post-Hurricane
Katrina, Segal uses social empathy to take a deeper look into societal structures, hoping to shift
social conditions to build a better world (Segal 2). The Berlin Blockade requires the application
of social empathy because one must go further than focusing on how the mission is bound to fail
given the lack of resources and demanding conditions for the inhabitants. Outside of the intrinsic
desire to help those who were malnourished and isolated in Berlin, it requires an individual to
face the greater contextual features of the crisis. For President Truman, this meant understanding
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that the Berlin Blockade would determine the political fate of the West and the world, despite all
the odds against him.
Furthermore, the West’s refusal to use violence based on their intuition speaks to the earlier
sections on individual tendencies. Reiterating the quote by Primatologist Frans de Waal, he
explains that we are a bipolar species, capable of “cooperation, teamwork, love, friendship,
empathy, kindness, forgiveness, compromise, and reconciliation” as well as “competition,
factionalism, hostility, sadism, cruelty, intransigence, and domination” (Raine 1530). In the case
of the Berlin Blockade, the United States chose empathy and teamwork over cruelty and
hostility. From the time when individuals formed tribes and eventually societies, protecting status
within the group could be demonstrated by exerting violence. For the majority of their
evolutionary history, violence was present among the small groups of humanity. One’s status
was particularly important in terms of survival (Liddle 27). Defining the in-group as those who
were against communism, the United States defied these historically effective tribal instincts.
Between the pressures of advisors who wished for violence to resolve the conflict, such as senior
officer General Lucius Clay, President Truman stayed consistent with the mission of the peaceful
airlift.
Altogether, the case in Berlin is one where the United States displayed its power, authority,
and strategy on the global stage. President Truman, among others, understood the necessity for
those supporting democracy to conquer communism. Coming from the end of a grueling world
war, the consequences of a broken Germany led the United States to avoid waiting along the
sidelines. This connects to Peter Singer’s moral circle, where the perceived shared fate of a
community alters who we wish to include within the in-group (Norenzayan 72). For example, he
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related children who attended schools with mixed races were more likely to ignore race as a
divisive factor. Children who attended racially homogenous schools were increasingly hesitant
(Bloom 119). Exposure to an “other” is essential by the adolescence stage, but the same applies
to the United States. Since Germany and the United States would be impacted by the threat of the
Soviet Union, the American intervention was of heightened importance.
Stalin made it a Soviet goal to force Germany to pay for the horrors their army had brought
upon the Soviet Union. While Stalin hoped to implement two Germanys, he lost the support of
his own people. Experiencing the harsh conditions of the Berlin Blockade, the German people
wanted a group to side with, an ideology to believe in such dark times. The in-group for the
United States, centered around the values of democracy and freedom from a Stalin-dominated
world, created a cause worthy of intervention and a prospect of hope. By making a clear
outgroup, those in support of communism, the United States could gather their resources and
troops against a common enemy, all while recruiting Berliners to support the cause. Additionally,
race plays a large role in defining the out-group. Just as Bloom’s findings show, racially
homogenous schools made race a more divisive factor for children. The primarily euro-centric
and white representation of Berliners could have influenced why the United States wanted to
help. Who they can identify as a victim is one issue, but another issue is who they can relate to.
The following two cases, Rwanda and Syria, will have victims that do not represent a primarily
eurocentric and white race. Along with many other factors, the weight of differing races appears
to make the United States more hesitant to intervene.
The Berlin Blockade was not limited to political gain. The intervention took place through
cooperation and empathy. There was much more to be decided by the blockade than the fate of
Germany. The United States had eyes and ears at the site of the conflict, from their own troops to
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the health professionals they sent. They were continually informed on the situation and could
adapt their tactics as needed. In the following case study, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda will be
utilized as a direct contrast to the Berlin Blockade. Without a particular geo-political interest in
Rwanda, the United States remained largely uninvolved in preventing the genocide. As we are
able to study the genocide in retrospect, the background of the conflict, what the United States
did, and what they should have done, will be outlined.

Rwanda
Recognized as one of the “greatest human rights disasters of our time,” the Rwandan genocide
killed between 800,000 to 1 million people, the majority which were overwhelmingly from the
Tutsi ethnic group (Burkhalter 44). Though there were many contributors to the genocide, it is
commonly believed that the Clinton Administration takes the leading responsibility in permitting
the genocide’s escalation. Rwanda, one of the world’s poorest countries, finds itself working to
develop national and local government institutions, maintain security, and promote
reconciliation. According to the U.S. Embassy in Rwanda, the United States is now committed
“to work with our Rwandan and international friends to help Rwanda meet the needs of its
population, including increased social cohesion in a peaceful, democratic and inclusive
Rwanda…” (U.S. Embassy in Rwanda). While these are the written statements of today, what
was the American role in the escalation of the genocide in the mid 1990s? The statistics of the
lives lost is difficult to fathom. As the international system stood by, the Rwandan genocide
progressed to unimaginable levels. Before comprehending how the crisis in Rwanda accelerated
in the manner it did, it is crucial to provide context on what contributed to the ethnic division in
the country.
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The genocide had its root causes in the “Hutu Republic’ ideology. From its peak in April
until June 1994, this ideology exhibited how it was founded on the hatred of the “other,” which is
the Tutsi (Kimonyo 2). To fully grasp this historic genocide, background will be provided for the
Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa groups. This will aid in explaining the measures taken by the international
community, specifically the United States. Acknowledging these three groups will also
substantiate the argument the United States’ held the primary responsibility for the genocide’s
severity. This case study focuses on one of the detrimental genocides in human history and the
manner that the United States responded. Themes surrounding the appeal to characterize an
“other” and the ties to one’s religion are evident in the American response to Rwanda.
On the surface, there was not much difference between the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. The three
ethnic groups shared the same language, religious beliefs, and coexisted within the same territory
(Kimonyo 9). The first inhabitants of Rwanda were the Twa, followed by the Hutu, largely from
Chad and Cameroon, and finally the Tutsi, who arrived from Ethiopia in the 13th and 15th
centuries. At this time, the Tutsi used force to conquer and enslave the Hutu majority and the
Twa minority. When the colonial influence arrived from Belgium in the 20th century, this support
was extended by the colonialists. They viewed the Tutsis as the superior race and created a
hierarchy for the roles of the Hutu and Twa. The Hutu were valued as servants to the Tutsi, and
the Twa as less than human. By 1919, the League of Nations granted Belgium authority over
Rwanda and the Tutsi elite were granted the luxuries of the Europeans, such as advancing in
their education (Kimonyo 20). With this history in mind, it is clear why tensions between the
ethnic groups grew harshly by the 1990s. There were conflicts among the three groups that had
not been resolved, coupled with newfound frictions.
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The 20th century deepened the division among the three ethnic groups. After the 1959
rebellion, the Hutu population received reassurance in their ability to take back power. During
this time, an exodus occurred where nearly half of the Tutsi population left to nearby states
(Kuperman 95). Even with the Tutsi population leaving, the unrest continued in Rwanda. In the
years following the Hutu rebellion, there was a struggle between the Tutsi and the Hutus to
maintain power. It was found that when Tutsi refugees invaded Rwanda, the ruling Hutu would
respond by massacring the domestic Tutsi. Starting in 1973, a northwestern Tutsi officer, Juvénal
Habyarimana, led a coup that made Northwestern Hutu dominant in Rwanda’s political, military,
and economic life (Kuperman 95). There was a slight period of rest, where the Tutsi were not
attacked on a large-scale. However, there were compounding factors that made living conditions
unbearable in Rwanda by the 1980s. Triggers like land shortage, soil erosion, devaluation of
currency, and a sustained population growth made food insecurity and famine common. In result,
violence and murders began to rise (Kimonyo 356).
These ethnic tensions can be explained through the tribal to chiefdom transition. Kinship
empowers the need for hierarchy or a central authority that dictates the community, and
Rwandans found kinship in three varying ethnic groups. In terms of societal progression, the
three ethnic groups portray tribal characteristics. For these three groups, there is an underlying
ambition for a chiefdom that encompasses the larger, denser, diverse populations, ruling over the
larger set of villages (Rondfeldt 44). And in Rwanda, each ethnic group believed that they had
the capability to rule and would do whatever it required to earn the position as the central power.
When achieved effectively, the chiefdom stage increases stability, resisting the division of tribes
and can develop the state and military.
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At the core of the Hutu and Tutsi conflict was the battle to achieve dominant political
influence over the other. However, the tribal inclinations never fully leave the structural
framework, even when there is an aim for a central power among divisions. In fact, when societal
progression fails, like in the case of Rwanda, there is a reversion to tribal tendencies.
The tribal need for “egalitarianism, mutual caring, sharing, reciprocity, collective responsibility,
group solidarity, family, community, civility, and democracy” becomes limited to the individual
tribes, rather than encompassing the entire chiefdom (Rondfeldt 56). In other words, the failure
to find one agreeable, central power increases dependence on one’s own ethnic group. This
transition from the tribe to chiefdom explains why the unresolved divisions between the three
ethnic groups became even more problematic by the 1990s.
As of October 1990, the relatively constant period in Rwanda was overturned. A rebel force
of Uganda-based Tutsi refugees, named the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPA), invaded Rwanda. In
1993, the rebels made headway against the Hutu-dominated Rwandan Armed Forces, and
President Habyarimana agreed to share power in August (Kuperman 95). This concession was
recorded in the August 1993 Arusha Accords, which ended the three-year civil war between the
Hutu government and the Tutsi opposition Rwandan Patriotic Front. By this time, the
peacekeepers for the group assigned by the United Nations, titled the U.N. Assistance Mission
for Rwanda (UNAMIR), arrived. Nevertheless, the damage was already done. For months, the
Rwandan president tried to modify the power-sharing provisions, and the Hutu viewed this as a
surrender to the Tutsi. The Hutu political power began to slip away, and there were plans to leave
the peaceful process and turn to exterminating political opponents. For instance, a moderate Hutu
cabinet minister, Emmanuel Gatabazi, was murdered by government soldiers on February 12,
1994. If one was not fully in favor of the Hutu under Habyarimana’s government, they were
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subject to execution. All of this considered, the official date of the genocide began on April 6,
1994, the date that the President Habyarimana was killed in a plane crash. The plane crash
ignited the first phase of the killings (Burkhalter 44).
In these beginning stages of the genocide, the United States intervention strategy was largely
nonexistent. By the fifth and final phase of the genocide, the Clinton administration was active in
deploying soldiers and visiting refugee camps. What was their reasoning to the late response,
especially with the increasing warning signs? For the United States, and others in the
international community, there were indications that would arguably be undeniable to turn a
blind eye towards. Although the Arusha Accords established a peaceful commitment to power
sharing and political reform among the ethnic groups, there were few that wished to adhere to its
pledge. Those under President Habyarimana watched their power slip away, and they quickly
made plans to execute political opponents (Burkhalter 44). Under the direction of the extremist
Hutu political parties, they formed militia groups while publicly condemning Rwandan Tutsi and
moderate Hutu political figures on the official government radio station. The Hutu radio station
Radio T´el´evision Libre Milles Collines coordinated the killing, with broadcasted that spoke,
“You have missed some of the enemies [in such and such a place],” it told its listeners, “Some
are still alive. You must go back there and finish them off . . . The graves are not yet quite full.
Who is going to do the good work and help us fill them completely?” (Holzgrefe 16). This was
one of many initial warning signs that left the United States and the international community
unmoved.
Once the plane had crashed, Belgium decided to withdraw their troops from Rwanda.
Violence immediately proceeded, and a United States department official reacted with, “How can
we get in, if it is so bad the Belgians have to leave?” (Burkhalter 46). At this stage of the
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genocide, President Clinton’s rhetoric downplayed the severity of the killings on both sides. He
never classified the situation in Rwanda as a calculated genocide, but a consequence of the civil
war or a form of tribal slaughter. And President Clinton was not alone in this judgment. In the
United States State Department, David Rawson, who represented Rwanda, reiterated the level of
severity necessary to classify a conflict as a “genocide” (Burkhalter 47). Rawson explained that
if the United States were to declare any and every issue to be a “genocide,” it would decrease the
significance of the classification. Without labeling the Rwandan conflict as a genocide, there was
no real urgency to aid the state. Throughout the following weeks, the United States supported
withdrawing their troops at the United Nations Security Council meetings. This left the Tutsi
able to finish their agenda with minimal repercussions. Considering the United States reluctance
to commit to the other human rights disasters, including the ongoing conflict in Bosnia and the
unfortunate experience in Somalia, the thought of growing their presence was even more
disagreeable.
With this history in mind, the United States had few interests, outside of the intrinsic value of
human life in Rwanda, to intervene. Rwanda geopolitically does not have the same significance
as a location like Berlin. On top of the general disapproval from the Pentagon, the Clinton
administration had just passed a policy that made rigid standards for the United States support in
future peacekeeping operations. In the middle of the Rwandan crisis, passed formally on May 5,
1994, the policy titled Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) would permit United States
participation if it had advanced American interests at an acceptable risk. Further, it must be a
threat to international peace and security, and an adequate exit strategy would be proposed
(Burkhardt 48). Unfortunately for those suffering in Rwanda, the PDD 25 would serve as an
excuse to prevent American military presence. With this policy and the previous intervention
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history, there was a vote to decide whether the UNAMIR should remain in Rwanda. The United
Nations vote on April 21, 1994 to reduce the UNAMIR presence signaled the third phase of the
crisis.
Assessing the genocide in retrospect, the Clinton administration made decisions that deserve
critical evaluation. One solution the United States could have made was to stop the Rwandan
radio broadcast that contributed towards the terror and killings from April to June. Instead, the
United States defaulted to the French aid. According to Burkhardt, the Rwandan crisis was
treated as a “peacekeeping headache to be avoided” rather than “a human rights disaster
requiring urgent response” (Burkhardt 53). Therefore, these scholars would agree that some
violence, or intimidation, is necessary to regain control. As discussed previously, violence is the
evolutionary response for protection against periods of instability. The rewards for aggression
can be vast, increasing power, resources, offspring, and social hierarchy (Raine 1540). In this
case, the United States might have used violence to the benefit of the vulnerable Rwandan
people.
On the other side, there are scholars who disagree with the United States implementing
violence to end the conflict. Considering the lack of information that the United States had about
the genocide, these scholars believe there was not room to make a proper judgement. In fact, it is
argued that the United States did not have the adequate intel to decipher the gravity of the
genocide until its final stages. A few years later, Philip Gourevitch recounts the genocide in The
New Yorker, to which President Clinton expressed shock. President Clinton writes in the margins
“Is what he’s saying true?” and “How did this happen?” By 1998, President Clinton delivers a
“Clinton apology” to which he states that the United States and the world community should
have done more to “limit what had occurred” in Rwanda (Power 2019). Alan Kuperman agrees
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that the United States is disproportionality blamed for the genocide. The overwhelming
consensus from the genocide was that the United States “can and should do more when the next
genocide occurs, there has been little hard thinking about just what that would entail or
accomplish” (Kuperman 94). He acknowledges that any intervention of any size would have
saved some lives, but the idea that the United States troops could have saved even half the total
victims is simply idealistic.
Furthermore, there are speculations regarding the delayed news President Clinton received
about the genocide. Accounting for the various media interpretations of the conflict, it was
ultimately not declared as a nationwide genocide until April 20, 1994. Beforehand, the violence
was depicted as a two-sided civil war in the media, which the Clinton administration echoed.
Additionally, the violence was reported to be decreasing when it was in fact accelerating. The
New York Times cited on April 11 that “the fighting has diminished in intensity,” whereas the
Paris Radio France International reported, “the fighting has died down somewhat, one could say
that it has all but stopped” (Kuperman 102). Finally, there was no verifiable human rights groups
or observers that made note of the genocide until the end of its second week. Similar to the
circumstances in the Berlin Blockade, Rwanda is a landlocked country, which would have
required that all forces be airlifted. Realistically, it would have taken 33 days to airlift the entire
force (Kuperman 107). Bearing in mind each of these factors, it becomes apparent why the
United States may have not responded in the manner that the international community expected
or favored.
Intervention comes with unintended consequences. Particularly, when the United States
offers humanitarian military intervention, there is the possibility that only the weaker side of the
conflict will be assisted. This could lead to both the parties rejecting compromise and continuing
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the fight because they anticipate foreign aid. Was there a way that the United States could have
avoided military intervention, and can this relate to our human tendencies? In Rwanda, there
were clearly two distinct sides: the Hutu and the Tutsi, who became unwilling to set aside their
differences. Maintaining a moderate position in either group would put you and your families’
livelihood at risk. Even so, it was shown that the Hutu and Tutsi did agree on at least one matter
– their religion. Ultimately both groups practiced forms of Christianity. Relating to the earlier
sections in the power of religion, this societal institution helps individuals measure one’s
reputation and establish standards of morality. Prosocial religions, those with Big Gods who
watch and intervene, contribute to the rise of cooperation in large groups of strangers
(Norenzayan 5). Believing and belonging to a cultural community influences people to come
together as a cohesive whole for a greater cause. If the resolution from the West could have
incorporated the Hutu and Tutsi to find common ground in their religious beliefs rather than
expand their differences, there may have been an earlier end or total prevention of the genocide.
Another key feature of human nature that these events illustrate is the in-group versus
outgroup distinction. The circumstances in Rwanda was a case where the various ethnic groups
felt threatened by the “other.” There are certain ways that humans define their in-group and
outgroup. Evolutionarily, strangers ignite fear, anger, and distrust. These feelings serve a
protective purpose, suggesting the innate desire for cultural identification. This is evident in
many facets of society, specifically through the actions of the newborn. We tend to be more
comfortable with the familiar, and it has increased our chance of survival throughout much of our
evolutionary history. By gravitating towards the familiar, one is preventing themselves from
unnecessary risks. The division between the Hutu, Tutsi, as well as the Twa, keeps a sense of
identity and protection in belonging to one group over another. With the United States as a

48

widely religious nation themselves, they would understand the ways in which religion could be
used as an intervention policy. They were also aware of the tensions that divide one in-group
from the outgroup.
It is compelling to compare one of the United States greatest intervention successes, the
Berlin Blockade, with arguably its greatest failure, the intervention in Rwanda. Their comparison
informs how the United States makes foreign policy decisions. In the Berlin Blockade, there was
a great deal at stake for American interests. With a vested involvement in the global mission to
prevent the spread of communism, the United States had to act quickly and purposefully in
Berlin. Coming from the end of World War II, there was a need to avoid any chance of enduring
another war. Meanwhile, the living conditions in Berlin were far from satisfactory. They had the
mission to save the world from communism, as well as the moral obligation to those suffering in
Berlin. The Rwandan conflict, although it was similarly landlocked, was approached in a much
different manner. As Kuperman (2000) describes, Western policymakers were unable to foresee
the genocide, even with the warning signs, because the act was too immoral to even consider
(117). Yet, it may be that the United States was too removed from the situation to understand
how the ethnic divide would inevitably lead to violence. The news sourcing to the administration
and the general public was far less covered than Berlin, even in an era with increasingly
advanced technology.
The ignorance of the administration or the general American public should not discount the
major foreign policy failure by the Clinton administration. When two opposing sides begin to
conflict, it is not unlikely that an avenue for violence will ensue. Had there been a mediating
force between the two sides, the situation in the 1990s may have never intensified to this extent.
Rwanda speaks to who and what causes an administration feels empathy for because there was
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not the same urgency or desire to intervene as there was in Berlin. By largely avoiding
intervention until the most critical period of the genocide, the United States made a message to
the world of which matters they care about. Even if the American foreign policy makers were not
fully informed, history tells us “it would be naïve to believe that these closely interrelated dark
sides of people can easily disappear” (Üngor 204). Mass violence is not a random occurrence, it
is a socially constructed event. When a group of individuals can channel their biological
tendencies towards destruction, the violence becomes collective. Here is a time where two ethnic
groups were left to their own devices for the struggle of national power. Without any checks on
their destruction, the results are clear in the causality statistics. It is challenging to excuse the
failure of American intervention because mass violence is not an untold story. The individual
yearning to come together and coexist among groups has been advantageous to humanity but also
has the dark outlet to devastation.
Similar to what Margaret Mead noted, and the Rwandan genocide proves, the appeals of
kinship and belonging come with a cost. The social construction of “us” versus “them” prevented
any sort of agreement for cooperation or harmony. Transitioning from the tribe, in this case, the
Hutu or Tutsi, to a shared, modern society is a gradual process. Every new advancement towards
collective organization offered an answer to the core problem that society was bound to face.
Self-interest can still be achieved through cooperation. There is also the fear for survival among
the tribes. Relating to Liddle’s explanation of parasite prevalence, this theory articulates the
reduced possibility for cooperation between groups. We have evolved to detect local parasites
and avoid infection, since they have brought adaptive problems. Within the parasite stress model,
the psychological devices that assess parasite prevalence encourage behavior that manage the
risk of exposure (Thornhill, Fincher, Murray & Schaller, 2010). The ingroup becomes the inner
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circle, and values like collectivism, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia are embraced. This lack of
cooperation lends itself to a world where individuals suffer poverty, inequality, and violence for
competing resources. The tribal conflict in Rwanda becomes an example of the parasite model,
where the Hutu and Tutsi groups were unable to cooperate, viewing each other as parasites to
their in-groups.
The parasite-stress model also applies between intrastate conflict, that being between the
United States and Rwanda. In the example from the Letendre et al. study, the parasite-stress
model can demonstrate the manner in which a global infectious disease leads to xenophobic and
ethnocentric cultural norms, as the in-group tries to protect themselves against the potential harm
of the out-group. They argue that this can happen between states, by intrastate conflict, as well as
within the state which is interstate conflict. Interstate conflict occurs when the out-group,
generally those who suffer great poverty, are left with mortality and deprivation from the disease.
Resource competition ensues, and the nation has an increased chance for civil war (Letendre et
al. 669). Although the case in Rwanda is not a matter of disease, it proves how the intrastate
conflict occurs as the in-group demotes the out-group, leaving them with little support and
abandoned in isolation. Unlike the victims in Berlin, who represented a euro-centric base, the
victims in Rwanda represent an entirely different racial and ethnic background. It could be
argued that American intervention is easier to decide when the racial and ethnic background of
the state and victims related. Thus, parasite prevalence is an evolutionary trait that understands
how we protect ourselves and the ways this develops division.
If real intervention took place in these early stages of violence formation, Rwanda would not
be rebuilding a new, hypocritical history that preaches peaceful coexistence. This multifaceted
transition is not simple, where ex-prisoners are now expected to develop the country that was
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taken away from them (Üngor 207). Reflecting upon the parasite model and other theories
regarding the in-group versus out-group distinction, the United States should have deescalated
tensions between the victors and the former prisoners. Instead, they chose to utilize excuses of
“American exceptionalism.” In a quote by President Clinton to Rwanda, he states, "It may seem
strange to you here, especially the many of you who lost members of your family, but all over the
world there were people like me sitting in offices, day after day after day, who did not fully
appreciate the depth and the speed with which you were being engulfed by this unimaginable
terror.” (Power 2019). This removes the sole responsibility from the United States, as there were
other people like himself “sitting in offices.” Shown by the prolonged and necessary American
assistance in the 21st century, the path for reform in Rwanda faces many obstacles ahead. Almost
three decades after the genocide, Rwanda continues to balance the interests of the three ethnic
groups and the need for solidarity.
As of today, the United States still donates money and infrastructure to Rwanda after the
devastating genocide. Under the United States Agency for International Development (USAID),
created in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy to promote American generosity and humanitarian
efforts, maintains aid to Rwanda into the 21st century (U.S. Agency for International
Development). Early on, USAID had established a program for Rwanda. It was in the 1970s
through the 1980s that Rwanda’s aid shifted from agriculture to education, expanding family
planning and addressing economic issues. At this time, USAID spent approximately $7 million
each year to support Rwanda. In the 1990s, the expansion of programs in economic development,
agriculture, and health also included democracy, humanitarian, and governance assistance. When
the genocide peaked in April of 1994, the donations halted, but were reassessed several months
later to provide emergency humanitarian aid. What is significant about Rwanda is their
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involvement with the American agenda far beyond the mid-1990’s genocide. It was evident that
the United States had assisted the country long before its conflicts climaxed. Although it is
argued that the United States failed the country in its most dire time of need, the aid improved
largely after the mid 1990s for recovery purposes.
From 1998 onwards, USAID/Rwanda moved to a “transitional phase of assistance.” This
period, which is categorized from late 1994 to 1999, totaled $61 million of United States aid. At
the turn of the century, USAID assistance from 2000 to 2003 averaged $34.7 million annually,
building and reconstructing Rwandan infrastructure. The allocations have significantly risen over
the last two decades, coming from $48 million in aid in 2004 to over $128 million in 2016 (U.S.
Agency for International Development). These numbers speak to the American commitment to
recover the destruction that came from one of mankind’s deadliest genocides. And its assistance
cannot go unnoticed. As Rwanda’s largest bilateral donor, the United States has decreased the
infant mortality rates, improved primary school enrollment, and reduced the poverty rates led by
agriculture. Even though the Clinton administration did not act upon the crisis in a timely
manner, these numbers show there was still work being done before and after the genocide to
ensure stability in Rwandan. The aid is largely reflective of a diplomatic strategy, rather than
solely military aid. As described in earlier sections, the benefit to foreign aid is that it is the more
“peaceful” way to respond to issues of political stability around the world (Guess 18). For the
United States, preferring the foreign aid moving forward is a selective choice.
While sentiment surrounding the Rwandan conflict varies significantly among scholars, it is a
case that will be analyzed closely for decades to come. Accounting for the hundreds of thousands
of lives lost, it is worth remembering and to deliberate future prevention strategies. In the present
day, there are enduring international conflicts that are applicable to Rwandan history. For
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instance, the final case study, the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis, has growing concerns that have
not subsided. Beginning in 2011, the ongoing Syrian civil war has displaced millions from their
homes and killed hundreds of thousands of civilians (Gross 2017). Debated as one of the worst
humanitarian crises in history, the manner in which the United States has responded is telling of
their modern intervention strategies. Although it is not classified as a genocide, the issues in
Syria are estimated to take decades to resolve, leaving 12 million Syrians displaced from their
homes and hundreds of thousands killed (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
2020). This final case study shows the possibilities for future American intervention in an age of
heightened technology and great power rhetoric.

Syria
The United States response to the Syrian refugee crisis has been “very mixed and variable
throughout the years, as the casualty numbers kept rising steadily” (Gross 2017). Since 2011,
more than 6.6 million Syrians were forced to leave the country, while another 6.7 million were
driven from their homes but remain within the country’s borders (UNCHR 20 June 2020).
Among the administrations that have handled the crisis, first being President Obama, then
President Trump, and presently President Biden, finding a strategy that balances American
interests in Syria with the necessary resources has proven difficult. After the unrest in the Arab
Spring of 2011, the pro-democracy revolt had the support from the West. Later termed as the
Arab Spring, Syria was one of many countries in the region who witnessed unrest, including
Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Oman, Algeria, Yemen, Jordan, Bahrain, and Libya. Syria particularly
stood out as a serious situation in the region once President Assad’s forces used chemical
weapons on their own civilians in a suburb of Damascus. Excited by the opportunity to assert
their influence in the Middle East, President Vladimir Putin of Russia sent military support for
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Assad, which turned the war in its favor.
When this attack occurred, the United States, and the international community at large,
had a duty to intervene. Adhering to United Nations 2005 Responsibility to Protect doctrine, the
great powers agreed to protect against, “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity.” More than this, the great powers agreed to assist one another in moments of
concern, fulfilling a collective responsibility of protection (Bellamy 2020). Whether it was a
combination of insensitivity regarding news about the Middle East or the last three major
interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya resulting in unintended consequences and collateral
damage, the United States and others in the West did not commit to the doctrine. At this time, the
former United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron and President Obama avoided
intervention. Rather, Russia’s President Putin sent military support for President Assad. Only a
few years later, the Syrian humanitarian crisis would be a real test of their duties, escalating to
historical levels of casualties and refugee migration.
By March 2011, the protests demanding the resignation of Syria’s Ba’ath government
intensified. Soon enough, the Syrian crisis reached neighboring countries, like Jordan, Lebanon,
and Turkey, which placed the entire region in danger (Jafarova 2014). The expansive effects of
the decision to avoid intervention are clear almost a decade later, as Syria is no longer a country
for safety and habituality. Syrians have no choice but to leave or suffer under the conditions of
the Ba’ath government. In Turkey alone, 3.5 million Syrian refugees reside (UNCHR 20 June
2020). The potential for radicalized youth and terrorism among the Islamic State increased, but
the United States had to weigh its interests with a potential long-term war. While it was always a
goal for the United States’ policy to remove President Assad from power, regarding him as a war
criminal and an obstacle to negotiating settlement, the plans of execution were ambiguous. It was
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not until the viral image of the three-year-old Syrian refugee Alan Kurdi, who was washed upon
the Turkish shoreline, that President Obama had a real response to the human rights offenses.
The photo, which was published on September 3, 2015, created the first large response
from the United States on the unacceptable harm taking place. Attempting to cross the
Mediterranean Sea to Turkey with his family, the only surviving member was his father. Kurdi’s
conditions represent one of many children suffering in this predicament. It is important to note
why Kurdi and other Syrian refugees are meant to be protected. This has to do with
classifications. A distinction must be made between who can be classified as a refugee versus a
migrant. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees explains the term migrant as
“someone who changes his or her country of usual residence, “while the term refugee is
“someone who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group…unwilling to avail himself/herself of the
protection of that country” (Stepanova et al. 298). Under this definition adopted at the Geneva
Convention in 1951, Kurdi and other Syrian refugees are protected by neighboring states for
entry. Certain powers upheld this obligation, others dismissed their responsibility to accept the
Syrian refugees. With these conflicting views, a select group of states, like Turkey, carried the
brunt of the refugee influx.
President Obama was aware of this, and made a statement that, “preventing mass
atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the
United States” (Slovic 642). However, the relationship between the United States and Russia, the
costly military loss, and an aggressive intervention that may lead to domestic terrorist attacks by
the Islamic State remained on the mind of Western leadership. In reality, President Obama had
taken some level of responsibility in the conflict and made calls to action amongst the
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international community, stating, “Russia’s intervention and airstrikes have reinforced the Assad
regime and made a humanitarian catastrophe even worse. And the entire world has been horrified
by images of starving Syrians – including children – reduced to near skeletons.” According to
President Obama, the migrant and refugee crisis would only be resolved once Syria stabilizes
(Liptak 2015). With this sense of urgency, President Obama pledged it would accept at least
10,000 Syrian refugees in the year following 2015, making a direct change from its earlier policy
stance. The United States stressed the distinctive and difficult fight ahead in Syria. Syria is not
just in a civil war; it contains a multitude of concerns that the Obama Administration and
succeeding administrations are forced to process. Therefore, the situation had to be advanced
with care, and President Obama believed they should try to end the conflict with “diplomacy”
(Obama 26 Feb. 2016).
In September 2016, the refugee crisis intensified, and President Obama hosted a Leader
Summit on Refugees. At the summit, President Obama argued that this crisis, specifically in
Syria, would require “a test of our international system where all nations ought to share in our
collective responsibilities, because the vast majority of refugees are hosted by just 10
countries…” (Obama 20 Sept. 2016). As the speech continued, President Obama made calls to
empathy, hoping to break the barriers of defining an “other.” He argues, “this crisis is a test of
our common humanity – whether we give in to suspicion and fear and build walls, or whether we
see ourselves in another” (Obama 20 Sept. 2016). The idea of empathy links to President
Obama’s call for understanding ourselves in another. Connecting to Segal, the motivation for the
United States’ intervention in Syria would be driven through maintaining social empathy. As
Segal wrote, social empathy is empathy that has the ability to read and comprehend the feelings
and actions of others with an understanding of their history. Even if many in the United States
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may not experience the conditions that Syrian refugees have endured, President Obama urges his
people, and the international community, to see them as a part of our common humanity. In order
to do so, he makes a call for the American people to apply social empathy to the Syrians.
As the transition of power occurred in the United States, the Obama administration’s
strategy persisted in some respects, and was abandoned in others. President Obama made calls to
address the crisis in his rhetoric, but many policymakers are critical of the overall lack of
transparency in the agenda. Particularly, President Obama was more concerned with destroying
the ISIS caliphate than the actual removal of President Assad. In his last two years of his final
term, the Obama administration moved away from the civil war itself, which involved training
and arming local actors to work against the Assad regime, to a counterterrorism strategy that
would destroy ISIS (Barron 2). Similarly, under President Trump, the demands for President
Assad’s exit were left to speech instead of action. As of early 2018, the break from Obama’s
policy would be the Trump administration’s suggestion to maintain a military presence in Syria.
Unlike President Obama, President Trump believed that it was significant to not withdraw at this
time. Still, the intentions of occupation were conceived to be reducing the Iranian influence in
Syria instead of forcing President Assad’s removal (Barron 3). From the outset, the Trump
administration was presumed to continue a presence in the region even after the caliphate’s
destruction. This all began to turn in December 2018.
It was the end of 2018 when President Trump made a surprise order to withdraw all
United States troops from Syria, following a phone call with his Turkish counterpart, Recep
Tayyip Erdogan. The consequences of this turn will continue to be evident in the coming years.
At the time, 2,000 United States Special Forces held together the coalition of 60,000 Syrian
fighters, known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (McGurk 69). In 2019, President Trump
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modified the order, leaving 200 United States troops to remain in northeastern Syria and another
200 to remain in al-Tanf, which is an isolated base in the southeast of Syria. Brett McGurk, who
had assisted in leading the global response to the rising Islamic State under both administrations,
argued the worst thing the United States can do is pretend its withdrawal, whether full or partial,
is “merely a tactical move requiring no change in overall objectives” (McGurk 70). Though
Syria is an unresolved issue, and the consequences are not fully known, McGurk fears the
reduced presence will be irreversible under future administrations. This presents a barrier for the
new Biden administration if they hope to change the course of Syrian foreign policy. Without the
United States’ military in Syria, the ultimate aims for a successful intervention cannot be
realized.
It is vital to note what is at stake as the United States pursues the removal of troops from
Syria. The military presence in Syria was meant to achieve an interwoven set of goals: the desire
to prevent ISIS resurgence, to regulate Iran and Turkey, resolve the humanitarian crisis, and to
negotiate a postwar settlement with Russia. Now, with the military removal, the two interests that
can be focused on are preventing ISIS from returning and Iran from building a military presence
that may attempt to threaten Israel. It was designed from the start to prevent an expensive
intervention. Costly, long-term interventions were condemned by the Trump administration. On
December 19, 2018, the plan took a surprising shift again. In a declaration via Twitter, President
Trump announced, “we have won against ISIS” and that “our boys, our young women, our men they’re coming back, and they’re coming back now” (McGurk 72). The abrupt change left
United States allies and partners in shock, although the violence in Syria had decreased over the
span of 2018. Had the United States preserved their forces on the ground and power over one-
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third of the country, they would have attained the position to shape post-war Syria. Most
importantly, for American diplomats, this power would have allowed the United

States to prioritize reaching a settlement with the only other great power in Syria: Russia.
Reaching a settlement with Russia would be the peaceful path to resolution to the conflict
in Syria. In 2018, the United States was preparing for negotiations with Russia alongside the
terms of the Geneva process. The process, which had been in place since 2012, would encourage
Russia to cooperate with the United Nations in peace talks regarding Syria. If this process failed,
the United States had a second plan to negotiate directly with the Russians and the SDF. This
would include the gradual return of state services in Syria, like schools and hospitals, under SDF
controlled areas. The United States referred to this plan as “the return of the state, not the return
of the regime” (McGurk 74). Furthermore, it would have credited those Syrians who fought
alongside the coalition for their continued safety and reduced the risk of insurgency against the
SDF and United States troops. The plan, though imperfect, was beginning to advance and
appeared to be building successfully. By upending the campaign in Syria, the United States will
not be able to prove they are a committed player in Syria (McGurk 80). As the United States
leaves the country, the SDF will need a new resource to maintain its presence in northeastern
Syria, protecting itself from Iran and Turkey.
Now entering its third United States’ presidential transition since the beginning of Syrian
conflict, President Biden will be forced to face the 10-year crisis that perpetuates the
international system. The new administration presents the opportunity to reevaluate policy in
Syria, which currently centers around isolating and sanctioning Syria. These sanctions are only
impacting the middle-class, but avoids the Assad-supporting elite, only “prolonging the misery of
ordinary Syrians” (Feltman 2021). At a key turning point, the United States has the ability to
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change the direction of their previous policies, or completely isolate themselves from the
ongoing issues. President Assad has earned a victory only in the climate “in which there is no
peace.” This victory is fragile, for a quarter of the prewar population has fled Syria, hundreds of
thousands have passed, and the economy is in disarray (Hof 2019). President Assad has won his
position of power temporarily, but only in terms of total destruction. With all of these
considerations, for many Americans, removing themselves from Syria altogether would still be a
preferred response.
When President Trump made the notion that “Syria is a faraway place and that countries
in Syria’s neighborhood should deal with the problems produced,” his opinion was not entirely
dismissed. In fact, it was welcomed. It advances the question, what responsibility, if any, does
the United States have to help the distant other? Especially when situations like Syria, with the
incomplete defeat of ISIS, the rise of Iran military presence, and the inevitable acceleration of
Islamist terrorism with President Assad in power persist. It is evident that burden sharing among
allies will be essential in how the conflict proceeds. Much of this burden will be focused around
the American commitment to Syria moving forward (Hof 2019). Money plays an immense role
in deciding what the future can look like. As previously discussed, humanitarian concerns to the
United States are defined as “driving both short-term assistance in response to crisis and disaster
as well as long-term development assistance aimed at reducing poverty, fighting disease and
other forms of human suffering…” (Lawson and Morgenstern 4). The main focus is on the
shortterm assistance, which works to alleviate immediate human suffering in both natural and
human induced crises. With the crisis in Syria reaching a decade and potentially years to come,
the United States has to decide whether long-term development assistance is worth the fight in
Syria.
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As for the Trump administration, the confidence in long-term resources has been denounced.
Another component that this crisis speaks to is who the United States helps and why.
Syrian refugees can be measured as an “other” to the United States, nevertheless, there are
moments throughout the past decade that show real American concern for those outside their
“ingroup.” Particularly, the photo of Alan Kurdi during the span of the Obama administration
“turned apathy into action.” One singular victim overpowered the rhetoric surrounding the
“ongoing refugee crisis” had failed to catalyze (Thomas 3779). Children have frequently played a
role in social justice and humanitarian campaigns. Typically, the photos contain saddening wide
eyes or a child’s bloated belly when appealing to media coverage (Manzo 638). What makes
Kurdi unforgettable is that the United States could understand an identifiable victim. Applying
the “identifiable victim effect,” it is widely believed that people are willing to disburse greater
resources to save the lives of identified victims than to save equal numbers of unidentified or
statistical victims (Jenni and Loewenstein 235). While the Syrian refugees had endured alarming
conditions for several years before Kurdi sparked a global, emotional response, it required an
identifiable victim for the United States to speak loudly against the human rights offenses.
There is a new level of unacceptable harm found in Kurdi’s predicament. The issue of
unacceptable harm is central to motivate pro-change responses. Johnathan Haidt, a moral
philosopher, claims that harm is one of the five bases of what people consider to be right or
wrong (Smith et al. 694). Humanity could universally agree that Kurdi’s circumstances foster
concerns of unacceptable harm. This universal response against harm was compounded by the
age of the victims. It is easy to feel compassion for children in particular, because the
iconography of children expresses key humanitarian values: humanity, neutrality, impartiality,
and solidarity (Manzo 632). Unlike the first two case studies, Berlin and Rwanda, the context of
Syria has brought about a new era of technology and viral imagery. The human rights atrocities
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committed against the refugees cannot go unsee from social media and news sources. If the
United States’ leadership does not speak on the offenses committed, these technological
platforms allow for awareness and a call for action.
The circumstances of Kurdi and the thousands of other Syrian refugees that were brought
to the attention of global powers agrees with scholars like Charles Beitz, Marshall Cohen, and
J.E. Hare who go as far to say that foreign policy is, “intrinsically a domain of moral choice”
(McElroy 4). Beitz, Cohen, and Hare’s views confront the realist notion that argues all political
action is goal-oriented because moral factors have influenced and will continue to influence how
the United States intervenes. If the United States removed the moral values that conflicted with
their national interests, there would have been no reason to commit to agreements like the United
Nations 2005 Responsibility to Protect doctrine. By the United States agreeing to assist in
moments of concern, fulfilling a collective responsibility of protection (Bellamy 2020), they are
prioritizing the common good over their own. Furthermore, the United States’ rhetoric around
the Syrian civil war mainly addressed human rights concerns. This proves an inclination to moral
choice, although it varied from the administrations. Of course, Syria offers a multitude of other
concerns outside of the crimes against humanity committed by its own people. The rise of
terrorism and the loss of authority in the Middle East are also main motivations for the United
States to remain in the conflict. However, the moral decision to help innocent refugees appears to
be a major motivation for supplying the state, and it may remain so until the crisis is controlled.
The appeal to avoid intervention in Syria altogether makes the responsibility to protect
increasingly demanding. Unlike the Berlin Blockade and Rwanda, it is unknown whether Syria
will remain a long-term or short-term conflict. At its current stage, there has been a steady
withdrawal of resources, alongside the isolating and sanctioning of Syria. This has left Syria to
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largely rely on other countries, such as Russia and Iran, to place pressure on President Assad’s
power. Currently, there are calls to develop a framework that will allow the Syrian government
to escape its economic and humanitarian crisis. A Carter Center paper released in early January
2021 outlines the United States need to address COVID-19 in Syria, the reconstruction of
civilian infrastructure, and a reversible easing of American and European sanctions (Feltman 29
Jan. 2021). The road ahead in Syria is not going to be easy, with President Assad demonstrating
no signs of compromise. Yet, this new plan enables cooperation in Syria by a step-by-step
proposal. After years of hoping to force President Assad’s departure, the United States may have
to abandon these efforts in exchange for this new approach. The Biden administration has the
chance to make these vital decisions in the upcoming months.

The Berlin Blockade, Rwanda, and Syria: American Interests Explained
Recall Holzgrefe’s remark that uttering the phrase ‘humanitarian intervention’ is “a bit like
crying ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre: it can create a clear and present danger to everyone within
earshot” (Holzgrefe 1). This is because these three circumstances offer different moral
implications, intervention strategies, and victim populations. Humanitarian intervention does not
look the same in various generations and locations. Throughout the decades when these cases
occurred, the United States’ actions were applauded, criticized, and pushed to “do more.” If the
goal of intervention is or should be to help those undergoing human rights violations, then these
case studies demonstrate what influences play a role in the leader’s decision-making process.
Among all these reactions, the states that were chosen for intervention likely had strong
geopolitical interests of the United States, similar racial ties, a short-term strategy, and an outlet
for peaceful intervention. Generally, if a strong geopolitical interest was absent, then the United
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States’ decision makers had to be able to empathize with victims that they viewed as part of their
“in-group.” Defining the in-group appeared to be increasingly difficult when racial differences
and long-term strategies were present. Specifically, the delayed reaction in Rwanda was a case
where the intervention required a long-term stabilization of the country. When the administration
could not easily view the victims as a part of their “in-group”, the requisite empathy needed was
not present.
In the 21st century, it is understood that the United States and the European Union wish to
focus on world order and global governance in areas such as human rights, the rule of law,
nuclear nonproliferation, rather than the geopolitical question of territory and military power. To
involve themselves in unnecessary matter diverts time and resources from these important
questions (Mead 2014). For Berlin, there was a heavy geopolitical interest for the United States.
At this time, the President Truman wanted to establish and ensure the institutionalization of a
postwar international order (Lewkowicz 2018). Its location and political implications for the
future of a democratic world made the decision to intervene that much easier. The objectives of
the Soviet Union deepened this fight. Combining these geopolitical interests with the background
of the Eurocentric victims, the United States could envision Berlin as a part of their in-group.
Although the Berlin Blockade was never a simple or short-term feat, it demonstrated the United
States’ willingness to allocate their resources to accomplish their vision of the new world order.
They implemented a mostly peaceful intervention strategy that continues to receive high praise.
When a state or community of individuals did not share the same geopolitical interests as the
United States, it was less likely an American intervention strategy would be implemented. For
example, Rwanda was not an area of concern for preserving a world order that profits the United
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States. Without this concern, there must be a need to feel empathy for its victims. Given the
absence of racial and geopolitical concern, having social empathy for Rwandans was not realized
until the mid 1990’s, long after significant damage had been inflicted. Lacking the connection to
the victims, the United States’ leadership would not involve themselves and their resources. It
will remain one of the largest failures of the United States and the international system. Still, it is
meaningful to review to show the factors that contributed to this extent of terror and violence.
Under circumstances that would undeniably lead to violence, as two cultural groups fought for
power, a mediating force was necessary. Rwanda should serve as a reminder to never allow this
extent of loss and harm to escalate, remaining aware of similar warning signs.
The actions of countries like Iran and Russia in Syria show they view the United States’
power as a chief obstacle in achieving their revisionist goals. They seek to reverse the “status
quo” of the modern world order, and this complicates the American intervention strategy.
Hesitant to create uproar between these powers, the United States approach to the crises in Syria
is cautious, which is also representative of many other issues in the Middle East. Despite the
horrific and known conditions of Syrian refugees and victims, aid to the country has been
deficient. The viral victims such as Alan Kurdi make humanitarian crises in the modern world
less likely to be overlooked. Even with this exposure, it is difficult to classify the aid under the
American strategy to equate to a full humanitarian intervention. Again, this is largely due to the
long-term strategy that is currently required of the United States to stabilize the state. With
unsuccessful stabilization efforts and the violence coming from Syrian leadership, this state
continues to reach equilibrium. Missing the racial ties and a short-term, peaceful strategy, the
crisis in Syria is nowhere near resolution. Under the Biden administration, this presents an
opportune time to alter to reevaluate the American strategy in Syria.
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Overall, these three cases offer insight into how human tendencies can explain the American
decision-making process in humanitarian crises. Analyzing the past and present cases, it is
distinct that the manner the United States’ forms their “in-group” reinforces who and how they
are willing to protect foreign victims. Compounded with their established interests in the
international system, the leadership’s predispositions play a role in creating tactics. Although
these three cases cannot speak on behalf of the American interests entirely, they shed light on the
manner the United States approached humanitarian concerns since the end of World War II.
They reveal the advantages of acknowledging human tendencies to know why powerful states,
like the United States, decide to intervene. The United States holding global authority means that
their aid to other states will be held to a high standard. Moving forward, the questions of whether
or not the United States should intervene on geopolitical goals or purely on moral grounds can
further be explored. Becoming aware of human nature’s influence on American intervention
strategies has the power to shape this discussion for the decades to come.
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